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Reconstructing Liberty, Equality, and Marriage: 
The Missing Nineteenth Amendment Argument 
NAN D. HUNTER* 
The social movement that led to adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment 
sought not only women’s right to vote but also the end to a system of mar-
riage law based on coverture. Under coverture, married women were 
deprived of property and contract rights and were de jure subservient to 
their husbands. Coverture also provided the predicate for denial of the 
vote. The model voter was the independent yeoman or worker able to 
express his own interests in a democratic system. Women were thought to 
be properly confined to the domestic sphere and dependent on their hus-
bands, who were presumed to vote on behalf of all household members. 
On this understanding, coverture and the state functioned as interlocking 
systems of governance. The nineteenth century Women’s Rights Movement 
was a campaign to reshape American democracy; eliminating coverture 
and extending full citizenship rights to women were necessary to achieve 
that goal. To use a phrase that we now associate with same-sex couples, it 
was the nation’s first marriage equality movement. 
Adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment marked a new social under-
standing that constitutional principles and democratic norms must apply 
to women’s role in marriage as well as to women as citizens. The move-
ment began by articulating a concept of collective liberty, which grew 
out of experiences in the anti-slavery movement and which expanded on 
the Founders’ more individualist concept of liberty in the Declaration of 
Independence. After the Civil War, the equality discourse of the 
Reconstruction Amendments and the rejection of women’s demands for 
the vote by both Congress and the Supreme Court reshaped the dominant 
theme of women’s rights efforts into a campaign for equality. The refusal 
by federal lawmakers to address women’s issues left them no recourse 
except to lobby state legislators, which women’s groups undertook on 
both suffrage and marriage law. But the diffuse, localized nature of fam-
ily law presented insuperable barriers to ending coverture in one pre-
emptive action. 
The Nineteenth Amendment reflects these dual goals in its text and sub-
text. The former prohibits denial of the vote based on sex, and the latter, 
by enabling women’s full participation in political life, rebuts the heart 
of the rationale for coverture: that women’s role in society lay solely in 
the domestic sphere of home and marriage. 
Failure to understand the centrality of marriage-law reform to the social 
and political meaning of the Nineteenth Amendment has impoverished the 
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constitutional grounding for contemporary challenges to the legal regula-
tion of marriage, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges. In Obergefell, which prohibited the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from marriage, the Court missed an opportunity to draw on the history and 
meaning of the Amendment to frame the issue as implicating dual systems 
of governance, both of which must be bound by constitutional principles. 
Instead, the Court described marriage as a largely prepolitical realm of 
private, idealized relations. The opinion of the Court failed to comprehend 
the extent to which marriage today continues to function as an institution 
of the state and a zone of governance, no longer because of coverture but 
because it is foundational to the privatization of collective responsibility 
that is embedded in the nation’s primary systems of social insurance.   
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INTRODUCTION  
“In the home is neither freedom nor equality.”1 
A growing body of legal scholarship is grounded in the understanding that the 
struggle for women’s suffrage was about much more than the right to vote.2 
See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Why the Nineteenth Amendment Matters Today: A Guide for the 
Centennial, 27 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 235, 236 (2020) [hereinafter Siegel, Centennial]; Reva B. 
Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 947, 949 (2002) [hereinafter Siegel, She the People]; Reva B. Siegel, The Nineteenth 
Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, 129 YALE L.J.F. 450, 451 (2020); Tracy A. Thomas, 
More Than the Vote: The Nineteenth Amendment as Proxy for Gender Equality, STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & 
CIV. LIBERTIES (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3364546 [https://perma.cc/T3BJ-4KTL]; Jennifer K. Brown, Note, The Nineteenth 
Amendment and Women’s Equality, 102 YALE L.J. 2175, 2175 (1993); W. William Hodes, Note, 
Women and the Constitution: Some Legal History and a New Approach to the Nineteenth 
Amendment, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 26, 26 (1970). 
Those whom we might call the framers of the Nineteenth Amendment—who 
drafted the first demand that American women be admitted to the franchise and 
who lobbied for its adoption in the half century after the Reconstruction 
Amendments—initiated a massive popular mobilization to accord women the full 
range of political, economic, and social rights that are intrinsic to citizenship. 
By itself, the change brought by the Nineteenth Amendment fell well short of 
transformation—both because it conferred only the vote, and because for the mil-
lions of black women living in the Jim Crow South when it was adopted in 1920, 
it failed to convey even that.3 
In 1920, there were 9.9 million black people living in the United States, of whom 85% lived in the 
South. FRANK HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE 20TH 
CENTURY 77 fig.3-4, 83 fig.3-8 (2002), https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/92PD-CW4E]. But by 1908, whites in the South had amended state constitutions and taken 
other steps to virtually eliminate black voting. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy and the 
Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 301–04 (2000). 
But whatever the shortfall between the goals of the 
most visionary suffragists and the impact of winning the vote, it is nonetheless 
true that the history of the Nineteenth Amendment offers a rich context for consti-
tutional interpretation related to discrimination based on sex, and one that has 
widely been overlooked.4 
In this Article, I argue that beyond its affirmation of women’s constitutional 
equality, there is yet another unmined and underappreciated dimension of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, one that focuses on its consequences for an institution— 
marriage—rather than on its ramifications for women. From the first formulation 
of the demand for women’s suffrage in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments, win-
ning the vote was both the ends and the means of the campaign for women’s 
rights. The primary end for which suffrage was the means was the transformation 
of marriage from a quasi-carceral institution structured around the legal subordina-
tion and dependency of women to a legal status founded on the mutual association  
1. CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, THE HOME: ITS WORK AND INFLUENCE 171 (1910). 
2. 
3. 
4. Siegel, She the People, supra note 2, at 949–51. 
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of free persons.5 It was in the early efforts to end coverture, as well as in anti- 
slavery societies, that women’s demand for suffrage was born.6 When the 
Reconstruction Amendments failed to provide for women’s voting rights and the 
Supreme Court upheld that failure, suffragists embarked on a dual campaign in 
state legislatures to win ratification of a new amendment and to secure the end of 
coverture.7 When the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted, the primary unfin-
ished business to which the suffragists turned was continuing the effort to change 
the law of marriage and divorce,8 a project not completed until Second Wave 
feminists secured it from the Supreme Court in the early 1980s.9 
In today’s legal and political thought, the right to vote and the right to equal 
treatment under law both fall under the rubric of civil rights. But the Declaration 
of Sentiments as a whole is more an indictment of despotism and a call to reject 
patriarchy as a form of anti-democratic rule than it is an assertion of women’s 
entitlement to equality. The Declaration was a radical claim for liberty from the 
legal regime of coverture and its economic and social manifestations. For suffra-
gists, the link between anti-despotism and equality grew from the concept of col-
lective liberty, a goal shared with the anti-slavery movement. A collective theory 
of liberty was a distinctive variation of the natural rights arguments of the nine-
teenth century. Suffragists directed this argument most urgently at the institution 
of marriage. 
In the wake of the Civil War, as the center of gravity in the framework for the 
suffragists’ demands shifted to primary reliance on the concept of equality, two 
facets of an equality claim emerged: one for the equality of women vis-à-vis men 
and one for equal treatment under law without regard to a woman’s marital status. 
The campaign for the vote sought both. Suffragists understood that the “full 
achievement of equality for women depended then and still does today upon the 
transformation of woman’s place within the family.”10 
In recent years, the most significant applications of rights claims with regard to 
marriage have arisen from challenges to the denial of access to marriage, espe-
cially the exclusion of same-sex couples. At first blush, it may seem paradoxical 
to base a claim to gain access to an institution in part on a constitutional under-
standing that was forged in a campaign to empower those who were trapped 
within that institution. But what unites the two is rejection of the use of state 
power linked to marriage to produce second-class status, either by subordination 
5. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 67 (2000) (quoting 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton: “this whole question of women’s rights turns on the pivot of the marriage 
relation”). 
6. See id. at 63–64. 
7. See Siegel, She the People, supra note 2, at 973–76, 987, 1034–35. 
8. See id. at 1008–09. 
9. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981) (holding unconstitutional a provision of 
Louisiana law which vested control of marital property in the husband). 
10. CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO 
THE PRESENT 329 (1980). 
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within the institution or by exclusion from it. Both of those results create and 
express status-based inferiority or unworthiness. 
The enormous changes in the social functions of marriage that have occurred 
in the 100 years since the Nineteenth Amendment have produced an institution 
that remains uniquely powerful but in different ways. In addition to establishing 
the rights and responsibilities of each partner, the legal system now relies on mar-
riage as an essential part of multiple social insurance systems. It is not an endorse-
ment of the privatization of responsibility for life necessities beyond the 
resources of individuals to note that important public systems, such as Social 
Security, and private systems, such as employer-based health insurance, rely on 
marital status and household composition to structure coverage plans and 
benefits. 
The richer understandings of collective liberty and social equality that 
grounded the movement to end coverture remain fundamental to contemporary 
arguments to redefine the law of marriage. Contemporary debates about freedom 
and equality in the home, to use Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s phrasing in the epi-
graph,11 build on the achievements of suffragists whose movement understood 
that marriage was a structure of governance, and insisted that it be made into a 
subsidiary component of constitutional democracy instead of its own quasi- 
sovereign legal realm. The demand for marriage equality in the twenty-first cen-
tury implicates the right to redefine marriage in ways derivative of the goals 
sought by the framers of the Nineteenth Amendment. 
This Article offers an interpretation of the Nineteenth Amendment to replace 
the more generic, hybrid liberty–equality principle that the Supreme Court used 
in Obergefell v. Hodges as the basis for invalidating the exclusion of same-sex 
couples.12 It relies on historically grounded understandings of marriage as a legal 
institution, rather than the largely ahistorical and idealized notions that character-
ize the opinion in Obergefell.13 And it demonstrates the centrality of debates over 
marriage to the conceptual and political underpinnings of women’s suffrage. 
In drawing on the texts that suffragists generated, I seek to incorporate the 
social meaning of what became the Nineteenth Amendment as it was understood 
during the long campaign for its adoption. The product of this argument is a 
theory for interpreting a part of our Constitution that has been treated as little 
more than a procedural correction for the oversight of failing to enfranchise 
women.14 In fact, extending the vote to women required one of history’s largest  
11. See GILMAN, supra note 1, at vii–xi, 171. 
12. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
13. Id. at 2594 (using references such as “transcendent importance,” “nobility and dignity,” “unique 
fulfillment,” “our most profound hopes and aspirations,” “the beauty of marriage,” “timeless,” and “the 
revered idea and reality of marriage”). 
14. “[W]oman suffrage has too frequently been regarded as an isolated institutional reform. Its 
character as a social movement, reflecting women’s aspirations for and progress toward radical change 
in their lives, has been overlooked.” ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE 
OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848–1869, at 17 (2d printing, 1980). 
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and longest mobilizations for legal personhood,15 
See Shall Not Be Denied: Women Fight for the Vote, LIBRARY OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/ 
exhibitions/women-fight-for-the-vote/about-this-exhibition/ [https://perma.cc/Y5EB-962L] (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2020). 
a campaign that targeted both 
the official arms of the state and the operations of governance in and through the 
realm of marriage. 
Part I briefly describes the legal context that generated the demand for suffrage. 
Nineteenth century American women confronted not only the absence of a right 
to vote but also an almost carceral law of marriage, with its central feature of cov-
erture, the legal regime that had the most direct material impact on early suffra-
gists. The two were linked: the enforced dependency of women within marriage 
was used to justify the denial of a right to vote. As a result, the demand for the 
vote was inseparable from a challenge to coverture.16 
The suffragists’ understanding of rights generally and specifically of liberty, 
which provided the primary intellectual framework for their demands, grew 
directly from the anti-slavery movement in which many of the early suffragists 
were active. The women who joined the abolitionist movement prior to the Civil 
War, and who later led the Nineteenth Amendment campaign, sought a double 
emancipation—initially of enslaved persons and then also of married women. 
Part II focuses on the primary textual and conceptual foundation for the 
Nineteenth Amendment: the Declaration of Sentiments adopted at the Seneca 
Falls Convention on women’s rights in 1848.17 Modeled on the Declaration of 
Independence, the Declaration of Sentiments was the first formal articulation of 
the demand for women’s suffrage in the United States.18 The authors of the 
Declaration of Sentiments analyzed the web of laws and customs that constituted 
marriage as an example of authoritarianism.19 
The women of 1848, like the Founders in 1776, prioritized the vocabulary of 
freedom and liberty, stated in terms of natural rights.20 But beyond the natural 
rights jurisprudence of the time, they also developed an original collective lib-
erty argument that transcended Lockean individualism. An understanding of 
liberty as collective as well as individual built a bridge to the equality argu-
ments that characterized contemporaneous advocacy of the Married Women’s 
Property Acts. Thus the first stage of the movement for women’s equal rights 
was emancipatory—the rejection of a divine power claimed by those who ruled 
families as kingdoms. 
15. 
16. Siegel, She the People, supra note 2, at 987. 
17. The phrase “declaration of sentiments” was also used as a memorialization of demands issuing 
from anti-slavery meetings and may represent one of the borrowings from that movement by early 
feminism. See, e.g., AM. ANTI-SLAVERY SOC’Y, DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS AND CONSTITUTION OF 
THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY (Pa. Anti-Slavery Soc’y ed., 1861). 
18. Siegel, She the People, supra note 2, at 987–88. 
19. See DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS (1848), reprinted in 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 70–71 
(Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., 1881). 
20. See, e.g., AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 1890 - 1920, at 
46–50 (1965) (discussing the natural rights argument espoused by Elizabeth Cady Stanton). 
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Part III examines the trajectory of arguments for women’s rights that began 
prior to the Civil War and which emphasized liberty from the subordination 
imposed by marriage law. In the wake of that war, the movement reframed these 
arguments in terms of equality, drawing on the national discourse of equality that 
produced the Reconstruction Amendments. When the Supreme Court rejected a 
Fourteenth Amendment-based argument for suffrage, feminists directed their suf-
frage arguments to state legislatures. At the same time, in the same legislatures, 
advocates pursued the other half of a dual campaign for women’s rights: eliminat-
ing the vestiges of coverture through adoption of the Married Women’s Property 
Acts. 
Part IV argues that by 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted, a 
variety of legal, economic, and cultural factors had converged to produce at least 
formal acceptance of women as equal political actors. Efforts to achieve equality 
in marriage were ongoing, based on liberalization of state laws, eventually culmi-
nating in a new understanding of marriage as partnership that had developed in 
the joint suffrage and Married Women’s Property Acts campaigns. The govern-
ment’s need for women to enter the non-domestic labor force during World War I 
undercut arguments that women belonged only in the home. 
The transformation of marriage law did not occur, as the suffragists had hoped, 
in one dramatic moment but instead on an excruciatingly extended timeline. The 
piecemeal character of the process meant that debates about revisions of marriage 
law occurred over and over again, in state legislatures and in the courts interpret-
ing the new statutes. Slowly but eventually, a fundamentally new understanding 
of the terms of marital governance emerged alongside the slow acceptance by the 
same legislatures of women’s right to vote. 
In Part V, which focuses on contemporary issues, I argue that an appreciation 
of the history and meaning of the Nineteenth Amendment would enrich the con-
tinuing resolution of challenges to restrictions on marriage, most recently the 
elimination of the exclusion of same-sex couples from access to that institution. 
Had the Supreme Court drawn on the lessons of the Nineteenth Amendment in 
Obergefell, it might have analyzed the issues before it with greater attention to 
the material, rather than the ethereal, aspects of marriage. One lesson of the full 
scope of the suffrage campaign—with its twin emphases on changing marriage 
and on securing the vote—is that marriage under law is a unique institution and 
one that, if the state elects to utilize and privilege it, must operate subject to the 
norms of a democracy composed of equal citizens rather than through the prac-
tices of caste and stratification. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Obergefell began its first substan-
tive section as follows: “Before addressing the principles and precedents that gov-
ern these cases, it is appropriate to note the history of the subject now before the 
Court.”21 In the “history” that followed, the opinion posited marriage as an insti-
tution anchored in a sacred private realm that the law has adjusted to meet the 
21. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015). 
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changes of time, thus strengthening it.22 An understanding of marriage as a sys-
tem for governing both individual rights and property, the keystone legal compo-
nent of the movement that led to the Nineteenth Amendment, appears nowhere in 
the opinion. 
Given the popularity of marriage, it may seem churlish to counter the Court’s 
narrative of almost fairy-tale simplicity and happiness. Although the rate of 
Americans who marry has declined, most do marry23 
JULIANA HOROWITZ ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN THE U.S. 4 (2019), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/11/06/marriage-and-cohabitation-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/ 
KGK8-89H7]; Andy Kiersz, This Chart Shows the Exact Age When You’re Most Likely to Get Married, 
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 12, 2020, 4:13 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/average-marriage-age-united- 
states-2019-2 [https://perma.cc/Q8LL-PV9C].
and doubtlessly carry the 
hope, realized by many, that their union will profoundly enrich their lives. The 
argument of this Article is not that marriage today remains an intrinsically subor-
dinating legal status for women, but that marriage as an institution must be con-
sciously reinforced with values of freedom and pluralism to merit its enormous, 
continuing degree of protection by the state. I leave for another day the question 
of whether marriage should ever receive such privileged treatment under law. 
This Article seeks to expand “the history of the subject” discussed by the Court 
in Obergefell and thus to reframe the relationship between liberty and equality 
that lies at the doctrinal core of any constitutional analysis of the structure of mar-
riage. Essential to that task is an understanding of the history that is missing from 
the opinion—that of the Nineteenth Amendment. New approaches to liberty and 
a radical reinvention of the relationship between public and private arose from a 
social movement that sought to overthrow the legal structure of marriage as 
surely as the Framers sought to overthrow British control of the colonies. To 
properly adjudicate challenges to the structure of marriage as an institution of the 
state, one must understand the ideas, the popular discourse and the social mean-
ings behind adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment. 
Through this Article, I offer three contributions to the existing scholarship on 
the Nineteenth Amendment, constitutionalism and social movements. First, I 
argue that the Declaration of Sentiments has been seriously undervalued for its 
distinctive contributions to nineteenth century political philosophy, specifically 
for its contribution to shifts in the meaning of liberty after the Revolutionary War 
and before the Civil War. The Declaration articulated a collective framing for lib-
erty, contradicting the conventional wisdom that the natural law philosophy of 
the Founders was limited to individualist claims of freeholders. It also directly 
challenged the gendered nature of the axiomatic principles—such as independ-
ence—underlying the natural law. Finally, the Declaration’s construction of lib-
erty as a collective claim of anti-subordination created a bridge between the 
Founders’ vocabulary of liberty and attempts during the Reconstruction Era to 
embed equality of rights as an enforceable principle of constitutional law. 
22. Id. at 2594–96. 
23. 
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Second, I demonstrate the doctrinal and theoretical connections between the 
campaign to change the law of marriage that the suffragists undertook and the 
goals of the effort to legalize marriage for same-sex couples. Both sought to bring 
the internal and external dimensions of the law of marriage under the control of 
constitutional principles and norms. I argue that the demand to end the system of 
coverture and its legacies provides as strong a plumb line as the suffrage demand 
for connecting the founding of the American Women’s Rights Movement in 
1848 with the adoption of the 1920 Amendment. In turn, the Nineteenth 
Amendment provides a richer basis for the Court’s decision in Obergefell than 
does the Court’s rather thin reasoning. 
Lastly, I identify the problems for constitutional interpretation posed by a text 
that—like the Nineteenth Amendment—emerged from a robust, divided and 
multi-generational social movement. Mixed motives drove enactment of the ear-
liest Married Women’s Property Acts, before the Women’s Rights Movement 
emerged from the Seneca Falls convention. In later years, feminist proponents of 
marriage reform also deployed shifting and sometimes contradictory arguments 
regarding women’s role in society. To the extent that there was a somewhat offi-
cial reason for the eventual adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, such as the 
explanation offered by President Wilson, it centered on a transactional relation-
ship between granting the vote and the contributions that women had made to the 
national defense during World War I. The litigation campaign that culminated in 
Obergefell also deployed a mixture of justice-oriented and expedient arguments. 
Yet despite these complexities that ensue from real-life political engagement, I 
argue that intellectually honest understandings of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
the issue of same-sex marriage, and the relationship between the two, require rec-
ognition of the centrality to both of deep changes in the social as well as the legal 
meaning of marriage. 
I. EMANCIPATION 
For middle-class women coming of age in the antebellum United States, life in 
a rapidly industrializing society began to offer not only access to education and 
employment but also points of entry for political engagement.24 Most white men 
had been granted the franchise regardless of property ownership by the end of the 
1820s.25 Social conventions discouraged women from speaking in public or even 
seeking signatures on petitions,26 but increasing numbers of women nonetheless 
sought participation in civic and economic life.27 One of the few venues for 
24. SARA M. EVANS, BORN FOR LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 60–61, 81–82 (1st Free 
Press Paperbacks ed. 1997). 
25. Id. at 76. 
26. See ELEANOR FLEXNER & ELLEN FITZPATRICK, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 46–47 (1996). 
27. In the first half of the nineteenth century, women living in urban areas in the United States 
formed hundreds of charitable organizations and, in the process, developed organizational skills and a 
sense of unfairness as to how the society treated women. BARBARA J. BERG, THE REMEMBERED GATE: 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEMINISM 265–66 (1978). 
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political discourse in which women were welcomed and even recruited was the 
anti-slavery movement formed primarily in the Northeast beginning in the early 
1800s.28 
In the anti-slavery movement, the women who later became the first leaders of 
the suffrage campaign acquired both organizing skills and intellectual ground-
ing.29 From 1837 until Reconstruction, “the development of American feminism 
was inseparable from the unfolding of the antislavery drama.”30 From abolition-
ism, women brought an egalitarian ideology and a theory of social change to bear 
on their own condition.31 Abolitionist writings began to reflect the crossover of 
the two movements, as exemplified by an 1838 abolitionist pamphlet recruiting 
women that “went far beyond women’s role in the anti-slavery movement” and 
constituted “the first serious discussion of woman’s rights by an American 
woman.”32 “By the early 1840s,” many abolitionists “proved themselves commit-
ted to advocating woman’s right as equal rights.”33 
Suffragists believed the vote to be not only its own goal, but also the means to 
reach a different goal of at least equal importance: ending the oppression embod-
ied in the regulatory structures of the law of domestic relations, especially cover-
ture. Under the law of coverture, absent exceptional circumstances,34 marriage 
stripped women of their rights to control their own property or wages, make con-
tracts, bring suit, assert independent rights to parent children, and make any of a 
long list of decisions about where and how they lived.35 Exit through divorce was 
minimal until the last decades of the nineteenth century.36 Combining demands 
for voting and for emancipation from the bonds of the legal construct of marriage, 
if not from their own marriages, created an eminently logical political program: 
“marriage and the state were both understood to be forms of governance.”37 
The strictest forms of coverture first began to give way early in the Republic, 
beginning with modest liberalization of divorce law when the Revolutionary War 
ended and states could take actions that British colonial authority had 
28. SUZANNE M. MARILLEY, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND THE ORIGINS OF LIBERAL FEMINISM IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1820–1920, at 20–22, 27 (1996); see also FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 26, at 
42. 
29. See DUBOIS, supra note 14, at 22; MARILLEY, supra note 28, at 27–28, 34. 
30. DUBOIS, supra note 14, at 31. 
31. Id. at 32, 36–38. 
32. FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 26, at 44, 348 n.19. 
33. MARILLEY, supra note 28, at 43. 
34. Nineteenth century equity courts occasionally provided protective trusts to safeguard the estates 
of married women. LEO KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 38–40 
(1969). See ALBIE SACHS & JOAN HOFF WILSON, SEXISM AND THE LAW: A STUDY OF MALE BELIEFS 
AND LEGAL BIAS IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 77–79 (1978). Customary law also developed in 
some commercial contexts such as whaling, in which wives needed to make family and business 
decisions independently while husbands were gone for long periods. Mary L. Heen, Agency: Married 
Women Traders of Nantucket, 1765-1865, 21 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 35, 45–49 (2019). 
35. See COTT, supra note 5, at 11–12; HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 
99–100 (2000); KANOWITZ, supra note 34, at 35–36. 
36. DEGLER, supra note 10, at 165–66. 
37. COTT, supra note 5, at 12. 
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prohibited.38 Efforts to enact married women’s property acts began soon after, in 
the first half of the nineteenth century.39 Legislators concerned with mitigating 
the extremes of coverture law acted in response to the concerns of multiple 
groups, including pre-suffragist reformers, seeking fairness for women;40 cred-
itors seeking repayment of debts incurred by women when they were single that 
became difficult or impossible to collect after they married;41 and fathers wishing 
to insulate property that would pass to their daughters from the opportunism of 
feckless husbands.42 
Coverture was more than a set of laws, however—it had social and political 
meanings as well as legal consequences. Socially, its acceptability ran hand-in- 
glove with the cultural norms associated with a philosophy of separate spheres, in 
which women were believed best fit for domestic responsibilities.43 Politically, it 
provided a rationale for denial of the vote for women, on the ground that the de-
pendence of wives on their husbands for economic support and legal capacity jus-
tified the husband’s role as representation of their interests in political life.44 As a 
result, understanding women’s citizenship in the United States “requires center-
ing on the institution of marriage.”45 
The overlap of culture with politics produced a justification for denying the 
vote not only to married women—as to whom the legal fiction of representation 
could at least apply—but also to unmarried women, who were presumed to be 
anticipating marriage or dismissed as “exceptions to the general rule.”46 
“[C]overture . . . transformed women into wives,”47 for purposes of the legal sys-
tem so thoroughly that its reach extended even to single women. The ideology of 
coverture conflated gender and marriage. The overall effect of such a transforma-
tion was that the legal system constructed marriage as the equivalent of a subsidi-
ary political institution. Marriage became both an instrument and a technology of 
power. 
38. LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT & IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY 
AMERICA 10, 159–60 (1980). 
39. First was Arkansas in 1835, followed by Mississippi in 1839, followed by New York in 1848. 
Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1359, 1398 & 
n.199 (1983). 
40. The New York Times editorialized in favor of reform as “legal protection and fair play” for 
women, distinguishing those concerns from those of “extreme advocates of Women’s Rights.” DUBOIS, 
supra note 14, at 46 (citing Property of Married Women, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1859, at 4). 
41. Chused, supra note 39, at 1402–04; Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: 
Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2135–36 (1994). 
42. Chused, supra note 39, at 1372; Siegel, supra note 41, at 2135–36, 2136 n.28. 
43. See DEGLER, supra note 10, at 26. See generally NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: 
“WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW ENGLAND 1780–1835 (2d ed. 1997). Although the culture of separate 
spheres opened paths for women’s influence in domestic and religious contexts, it simultaneously 
“barricaded all others.” Id. at 200–01. 
44. Siegel, She the People, supra note 2, at 981–87; see also HARTOG, supra note 35, at 106. 
45. Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830–1934, 103 AM. 
HIST. REV. 1440, 1442 (1998). 
46. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872). 
47. HARTOG, supra note 35, at 135. 
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What the suffragists saw in the lives of middle-class women like themselves 
was a two-sided trap constructed by and through law: civil erasure upon entering 
marriage enacted through the doctrine of coverture, combined with exclusion 
from most paid employment—the only means other than marital dependency to 
secure the necessities of life.48 The legal incidents of marriage blocked women’s 
ability to exit the domestic sphere49 and operated in tandem with practices that re-
stricted entry to the labor market.50 
A second dimension of the power of coverture lay in the quasi-sovereignty of 
its jurisdictional authority. Marriage generated not just gender-defined devices of 
subordination but also a realm of private governance—by the husband—into 
which courts seldom ventured so long as the marriage was ongoing.51 This ves-
tige of coverture endured even after decades of reform had chipped away at prop-
erty and contract laws.52 
II. THE CHARTER OF AMERICAN FEMINISM 
American feminism’s foundational text, the Declaration of Sentiments adopted 
at the 1848 Seneca Falls convention, framed the movement’s goals as broadly 
and deeply challenging to male supremacy.53 
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON ET AL., DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS – SENECA 
FALLS (1848), https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/coretexts/_files/resources/texts/1848DeclarationofSentiments. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/LP4Q-K8UB].
It prioritized two goals: winning the 
vote, and eliminating male prerogatives in the law of marriage.54 The attack on 
coverture “was no timid sister” of the effort to win the vote.55 Suffragists also 
believed that enfranchising women would force adoption of laws eliminating  
48. Traditionally, marriage law has been “fashioned to a considerable extent with the employability 
of women in mind.” KANOWITZ, supra note 34, at 98. 
49. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and other suffrage leaders advocated legal changes that would make 
divorce easier. DEGLER, supra note 10, at 175. Stanton also argued that women’s power within marriage 
would be enhanced by having stronger rights to her own property and earnings. KRADITOR, supra note 
20, at 47. 
50. Susan B. Anthony also linked suffrage to economic empowerment, saying in 1869 that suffrage 
“will change the pecuniary position of woman; it will place her where she can earn her own bread. . . . 
She will not then be driven to such employments only as man chooses for her.” Susan B. Anthony, 
Remarks at the May Anniversaries of the American Equal Rights Association in N.Y. and Brook. (May 
12–14, 1869), in 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 378, 383 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony 
& Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., 1881). 
51. The most commonly cited reason was the need to preserve “domestic harmony.” Note, Litigation 
Between Husband and Wife, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1650, 1650 (1966). Courts also reasoned that judicial 
fora were not the proper venues for intra-family debates. Id. at 1655. One court declared that a “wide 
latitude of discretion must be allowed” to husbands for decisions about expenses. Id. at 1657 (quoting 
Pattberg v. Pattberg, 120 A. 790, 791 (N.J. Ch. 1923)). 
52. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 370–71 
(1978) (arguing that “[a]djudication is not a proper form of social ordering” in some cases, such as those 
involving agreements between husband and wife on domestic matters). 
53. 
 
54. See id. 
55. Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household 
Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1078 (1994). 
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coverture.56 
“[I]t will be woman’s fault, if, the ballot once in her hand, all the barbarous, demoralizing, and 
unequal laws, relating to marriage and property, do not speedily vanish from the statute-book . . . .” 
Wendell Phillips, on behalf of the Business Committee, Resolutions at the Proceedings of the Woman’s 
Rights Convention, Held at Worcester, October 15th and 16th, 1851 (transcript of address and 
resolutions available at the Library of Congress), https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/rbc/ 
rbnawsa/n8287/n8287.pdf https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbnawsa.n8287/?sp=1&st=gallery [https:// 
perma.cc/43UM-5YYA https://perma.cc/FU8F-TGWB].
The tendency today to associate Seneca Falls only with the former 
overlooks what many feminists at the time thought was the more important 
issue.57 
A. THE DECLARATION 
The idea to call a convention on the rights of women grew directly from the 
work of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and others to persuade the New York legislature 
to enact a bill granting married women more power over their own property.58 
Their petition to the legislature had invoked “your Declaration of Independence” 
and argued that women, having never consented to the laws under which they 
were governed, should not be bound by them.59 Stanton wanted to do more. 
Triggered by her advocacy of the property reform bill, her memory of the exclu-
sion of women from an anti-slavery conference in London and her own experien-
ces as a wife and mother, Stanton led the group in calling for a convention to 
discuss the “rights of woman.”60 
Stanton used the Declaration of Independence as her primary model, in a delib-
erate attempt to signal the radicalism of the group’s demands.61 As a result, the 
language and structure of the Declaration of Sentiments closely parallels that of 
the Declaration of Independence.62 The Declaration of Sentiments stressed two 
themes.63 One was that the denial of voting rights to women exposed the nation’s 
hypocrisy in claiming to be based on the “consent of the governed.”64 The other, 
placed second but given more space in the text, was that men’s domination of 
56. 
 
57. See DEGLER, supra note 10, at 329; see also Thomas, supra note 2, at 11–12. 
58. EVANS, supra note 24, at 93–94. 
59. Id. at 94. 
60. FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 26, at 69. 
61. KRADITOR, supra note 20, at 1; Siegel, She the People, supra note 2, at 987–88. Stanton wrote: 
“The reports of Peace, Temperance, and Anti-Slavery conventions were examined, but all alike seemed 
too tame and pacific for the inauguration of a rebellion such as the world had never before seen.” 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Planning the Seneca Falls Convention: 1848, in KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS EMERGES WITHIN THE ANTISLAVERY MOVEMENT 1830-1870: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH 
DOCUMENTS 170, 171 (2000). 
62. Like the latter, the former comprises “a classical oration in five parts.” Howard Mumford Jones, 
The Declaration of Independence: A Critique, in THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: TWO ESSAYS 3, 
3 (1976). It begins with a brief paragraph adopting the goal of self-sovereignty; continues with a longer 
paragraph stating general principles; enumerates the grievances that require redress; and concludes with 
resolutions and a final statement of the signers’ commitment to the effort. See id. 
63. There was consensus for the sections relating to reform of marriage and other laws; Stanton also 
included the right of women to vote despite less than unanimous agreement. MARILLEY, supra note 28, 
at 50–51. 
64. DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS (1848), supra note 19, at 70–71. 
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women, described most frequently in the enumerations section as occurring in the 
context of family law, constituted a form of tyranny.65 
The opening general principles section stressed the end of a colonization of 
women’s lives.66 Of the fifteen grievances alleged to specify “this entire disen-
franchisement,” the Declaration of Sentiments began with four that assert the 
right to vote and five that describe the injustices of the law of marriage and 
divorce.67 The remaining six address employment, education, the ministry, a dou-
ble standard for morals, and what we would call today emotional abuse.68 
The parallel structures of the Declaration of Sentiments and the Declaration of 
Independence illustrate more than a linguistic coincidence or historical echo. 
Fundamentally, both attacked tyranny. The key difference grew from the contrast 
between the experiences of the two respective groups of drafters. The white male 
property owners who signed the Declaration of Independence were not seeking 
the right to vote per se, which they had exercised with regard to local matters in 
colonial assemblies, but instead the creation of a new sovereign state in which 
their voting was assumed. The women of 1848 were not seeking a new sovereign 
state, but to jettison an old one—the kingdom built on coverture—and to enter an 
existing one, through voting. Thus, the Declaration of Sentiments resonates with 
the themes of collective autonomy for a class of persons and the right to inclusion 
of the class in the processes and structures of governance. 
B. COLLECTIVE LIBERTY AND THE BRIDGE TO EQUALITY 
Traditionally understood, liberty presents a quintessentially individualist 
claim. The Declaration of Independence reflected the belief that an implicit  
65. Linda Kerber described “the first, and most firmly voiced complaints” in the Declaration as “the 
denial of the suffrage, the economic and physical subordination of married women to their husbands, the 
vulnerability of women in divorce cases. These were the most substantial and serious of the women’s 
resentments.” Linda K. Kerber, From the Declaration of Independence to the Declaration of Sentiments: 
The Legal Status of Women in the Early Republic 1776-1848, 6 HUM. RTS. 115, 116 (1977). 
66. In its second paragraph stating general principles, the Declaration of Independence states: 
[W]hen a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces 
a design to reduce them to absolute despotism . . . . Such has been the patient sufferance of 
these colonies . . . . The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated 
injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny 
over these states.  
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (italics added). The second paragraph of the 
Declaration of Sentiments states: 
[W]hen a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces 
a design to reduce them under absolute despotism . . . . Such has been the patient sufferance 
of the women . . . . 
The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man 
toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her.  
DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS (1848), supra note 19, at 70. 
67. See id. at 70–71. 
68. See id. at 71. 
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component of a claim for liberty as an inalienable natural right is the assertion of 
an equal entitlement by rights-bearing subjects to freedom from oppression and 
appropriation by the state.69 The colonial elites in protest against the divine right 
of kings asserted their prerogative for self-government, certain in their belief that 
God created them as equals to the white, male property owners in England who 
ruled them. 
Even today, in the jurisprudence of natural rights, liberty holds a central and 
fundamental position: it is posited as the source of both property and freedom and 
of the linkage between the two. Liberty is considered to be prepolitical, the core 
of a philosophy that privileges the survival of fundamental personal freedoms 
that remain shielded from state intrusion even after the individual gives up other 
prerogatives in order to obtain the benefits of mutual protection that are provided 
by government.70 It is on this basis that libertarians claim the 1776 Declaration of 
Independence as evidence of a congenial original understanding that prioritizes 
individualist rights over mutuality.71 
Against this background, the Declaration of Sentiments stands in underappreci-
ated contrast, a foundational document in American constitutionalism. The wom-
en’s demand for collective liberty was new, not simply a repeat of the individualist 
understanding of liberty upon which the Declaration of Independence was based. 
The idea of a collective liberty right arose from a position of class-wide exclusion 
from political rights, as voiced by black Americans and women, rather than from 
one of less power than others of comparable economic and social standing that 
characterized the signers of the Declaration of Independence and the Framers of 
the Constitution.72 The breakthrough of the Declaration of Sentiments was its 
claim for liberty not just as an individual right applicable as much to property as to 
freedom, but also as one made in the voice of anti-subordination. 
More specifically, the Declaration called out the ways in which the law and 
norms of coverture destroyed the purported universalism of natural law philoso-
phy. The limiting principle as to the scope of liberty, inherited from English  
69. The most influential source for their beliefs was John Locke, author of The Second Treatise of 
Government. See MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11 (1978). 
70. Randy E. Barnett, The Declaration of Independence and the American Theory of Government: 
“First Come Rights, and Then Comes Government,” 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25–26 (2019). 
71. Id. at 25 (“They are not group rights. They are not collective rights. They are the individual rights 
of We the People, each and every one.”). 
72. As historian Ellen DuBois wrote with regard to the tradition of women’s rights: 
[It] treats rights . . . as something to be won and exercised collectively rather than individu-
ally; as the object of political struggle . . . ; as that which government affirmatively estab-
lishes rather than negatively shields; and above all as that which has greatest meaning not to 
the powerful, who already enjoy their entitlements, but to the powerless, who have yet to 
have their full place in society recognized.  
Ellen Carol DuBois, Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Bradwell, Minor, and Suffrage Militance in 
the 1870s, in ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 81, 83 
(Marjorie Spruill Wheeler ed., 1995). 
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common law, was sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, or the maxim that one’s 
liberty extends only to the point that it does not harm another.73 Although por-
tions of Locke’s work treat women as separate political subjects, he nonetheless 
describes women only in the context of their relationships to others.74 A woman 
defined as wife and especially mother could not be a free actor without possibly 
harming her children, a deep cultural trope that persists in the legal powers 
granted to states to regulate pregnant women. Thus, women could be per se 
barred from the complete natural rights understanding of liberty. Additionally, 
Locke’s philosophy predicated the right to vote on independence, symbolized by 
ownership of property.75 Coverture enforced dependence, and financial depend-
ence signaled the inability to vote as a free agent. 
Lastly, the Declaration of Sentiments provided a rhetorical bridge to a fuller 
belief in equality that, for its most committed drafters, did extend to “all men and 
women.” The underlying political theory in the Declaration of Sentiments came 
from the anti-slavery movement, expanded to capture the social status of women. 
As stated in the call for the First National Women’s Rights convention after 
Seneca Falls: 
In the relation of marriage [woman] has been . . . enslaved in all that concerns 
her personal and pecuniary rights; and even in widowhood and single life, she 
is oppressed [in ways that] mark the condition of a disabled caste.76 
The language of equality was not absent from the Declaration of Sentiments, 
as exemplified by how the recitation section of the 1776 document of “self-evi-
dent truths” was altered in 1848 to begin: “that all men and women are created 
equal.”77 But equality as we understand it today—not just as an inborn quality of 
each human but as a binding principle applying to all forms of political and social 
life—was not the dominant understanding at that time.78 As it was used in the 
Declaration of Independence, equality was understood to be an aspirational term, 
such that it could coexist with slavery.79 
73. Elmer E. Smead, Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas: A Basis of the State Police Power, 21 
CORNELL L.Q. 276, 276, 278 (1936). 
74. See KERBER, supra note 38, at 17–18, 27. 
75. See WHITE, supra note 69, at 259–60 (noting that Alexander “Hamilton’s willingness to accept 
the idea of property qualifications for voting” were based on “Lockean moral philosophy”). 
76. Siegel, supra note 55, at 1100 (citation omitted). 
77. STANTON ET AL., supra note 53 (emphasis added). In addition, the penultimate section of 
resolutions contains additional references specifically to equality, for example, “that woman is man’s 
equal—was intended to be so by the Creator” and “[t]hat the equality of human rights results necessarily 
from the fact of the identity of the race in capabilities and responsibilities.” Id. 
78. The distinction is reflected in a resolution adopted by an 1851 women’s convention declaring 
“[t]hat we do not feel called upon to assert or establish the equality of the sexes . . . . [N]atural and political 
justice, and the axioms of English and American liberty, alike determine that rights and burdens—taxation 
and representation—should be co-extensive . . . .” Resolutions Passed at a Woman’s Rights Convention 
(1851), as reprinted in UP FROM THE PEDESTAL 220, 221 (Aileen S. Kraditor ed., 1968). 
79. See ALEXANDEER TSESIS, FOR LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 20 (2012). 
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C. SOCIAL MEANINGS 
Various political actors wove themes of equality into popular interpretation of 
the Declaration of Independence, retroactively making it into an anthem that 
reaches beyond the horizons envisioned by those who wrote it. Historian Pauline 
Maier has described how the Declaration of Independence was remade into a “sa-
cred text,” one that is understood to stand for equality even though it “was, in 
fact, a peculiar document to be cited by those who championed the cause of 
equality.”80 Most Americans believe that the “created equal” phrase from the 
Declaration of Independence is part of the Constitution.81 Political philosopher 
Danielle Allen has argued that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the primary 
message and public meaning of the Declaration of Independence today is not lib-
erty but equality.82 
Through the Declaration of Sentiments, the suffragists expanded the meanings 
of liberty and equality from what was in the Declaration of Independence in a 
unique way. Unlike the Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of 
Sentiments identified two governance structures at issue: the official public state, 
and the state-enforced rules of the purportedly private ream of marriage. The 
meanings created by the early suffragists—collective liberty from domestic tyr-
anny and equality in the purportedly private sphere—provided an understanding 
of liberty and equality as constructed by and through the operations of gender. 
Just as the Declaration of Independence inspired and remains associated with the 
equality guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Declaration of Sentiments 
merits inclusion among the nation’s foundational texts as the inspiration and 
engine for the Nineteenth Amendment. 
III. A DUAL CAMPAIGN 
Women’s rights advocates built on the analysis and political theory derived 
from the Declaration of Sentiments to create a social movement that led to the 
Nineteenth Amendment. I will analyze the movement in three stages that mark 
the development of the underlying legal arguments. From Seneca Falls through 
the Civil War, the campaign focused on ending coverture. The effort to reform 
marriage law had begun before 1848, but women’s rights advocates effectively 
took over its leadership through their organizing after Seneca Falls.83 Even during 
the war years, Elizabeth Cady Stanton continued her focus on family law issues 
during the lyceum circuit speaking tours she did from 1861 to 1872.84 
80. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 175, 192 
(1997). Maier goes on to explain: “Not only did its reference to men’s equal creation concern people in a 
state of nature before government was established, but the document’s original function was to end the 
previous regime, not to lay down principles to guide and limit its successor.” Id. at 192. 
81. Katie R. Eyer, The Declaration of Independence as Bellwether, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 427, 428 
(2016). 
82. See DANIELLE ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION: A READING OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
IN DEFENSE OF EQUALITY 108, 275–77 (2014). 
83. Siegel, supra note 41, at 2137. 
84. Thomas, supra note 2, at 12. 
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In the second stage, after the Civil War ended and the Reconstruction 
Amendments failed to provide suffrage for women, women’s rights advocates 
sought the vote through the courts, relying on the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although the second phase ended when the Supreme Court rejected that argu-
ment in Minor v. Hapersett,85 the movement’s reliance on a discourse of equality 
continued. A women’s declaration issued in 1876, during the centennial celebra-
tions of the Constitution, illustrated the extent to which the constitutional argu-
ments made in Minor had realigned the rationale for women’s suffrage into one 
based on legal doctrine and a more individualized sense of rights claims. 
The third stage stretched from 1876 until the adoption of the Nineteenth 
Amendment in 1920. Women’s rights advocates returned to the arenas of legisla-
tion and elections, pursuing both suffrage and marriage reform, with the single- 
issue argument for the former goal taking priority over the latter, which involved 
multiple and complex issues of family law. 
During the entire period, however, the political and social meanings of the two 
parts of this dual campaign remain fused in the debates over women’s legal and 
social independence. 
A. FROM SENECA FALLS TO FORT SUMTER 
Agitation for additional married women’s property acts increased dramatically 
in the decade leading up to the Civil War because of the women’s rights organiz-
ing that followed Seneca Falls.86 At the national and local women’s rights 
conventions held throughout the 1850s, “participants’ resentment at wives’ sub-
ordination within marriage” was often voiced more frequently than the demand 
for suffrage.87 Elimination of “‘all the barbarous, demoralizing, and unequal laws 
related to marriage and property’ [was] their primary goal.”88 References to 
the legal rights, or lack thereof, of married women appear repeatedly in the reso-
lutions adopted by these conventions.89 The women’s “[c]onventions put the 
issues of women’s rights into the press and before the public eye almost 
continuously.”90 
In addition, between 1845 and 1860, almost every state adopted a new consti-
tution.91 Provisions to change the law of marital property arose repeatedly at the  
85. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 163, 178 (1875). 
86. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 3. 
87. COTT, supra note 5, at 64. 
88. MARILLEY supra note 28, at 53; see also Thomas, supra note 2, at 11. 
89. See, e.g., Address to the Second National Convention in Worcester, reprinted in 1 HISTORY OF 
WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 19, at 238 (statement of Ernestine Rose) (“In the laws of the land she has 
no rights; in government she has no voice. . . . From the cradle to the grave she is subject to the power 
and control of man. . . . At marriage, she loses her entire identity, and her being is said to have become 
merged in her husband.”); Address to the Syracuse National Convention, September 8, 9, and 10, 1852, 
reprinted in 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 19, at 517–30. 
90. THE CONCISE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 89 (Mari Jo Buhle & Paul Buhle eds., 2005); see 
also MARILLEY, supra note 28, at 54–55, 62–64. 
91. HARTOG, supra note 35, at 110. 
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conventions where constitutional changes were drafted.92 In addition to New 
York, especially intense debates occurred in Wisconsin, California, and Indiana, 
in which “men declared that these were the most important, most fundamental 
measures considered within the draft constitutions.”93 Women also scheduled 
separate conventions in tandem with the state amendment process in order to 
demand “just laws for married women” and suffrage.94 
Together, the two sets of conventions ensured that debates over changes to the 
law of marriage became part of the political landscape at midcentury. Although 
women’s rights concerns did not initiate the pre-Seneca Falls property law 
amendments, they came to dominate or at least shape legislative enactments in an 
impressively short period of time. In three major states—New York, Ohio, and 
Massachusetts—women’s lobbyists drove changes that became models for other 
states.95 By 1861, the majority of states had adopted some form of protection of 
married women’s property, motivated by a mix of feminist and unrelated con-
cerns.96 Congress, too, had taken note; it addressed the issue of married women’s 
property ownership in the legislation establishing the terms for land grants in 
western territories such as Oregon.97 
By the onset of the Civil War, several realities about the politics of marriage- 
law reform had emerged that would continue to mold the social meanings of that 
branch of feminism well into the next century. As time went on, women’s rights 
advocacy came to the forefront of the arguments in favor of revising marriage 
law, although mixed motives endured. But feminist demands shifted. Women 
began by seeking relatively modest changes (at least by today’s standards) related 
mostly to maintaining separate ownership of property and the independent 
capacity to contract, as well as joint guardianship of children. Prewar successes 
led to what turned out to be premature celebration.98 As the early issues were 
addressed in the most progressive states, women pressed others, seeking new 
rights on issues such as control of their own wages, inheritance law, and the  
92. Id. at 110–11. 
93. Id. at 111. 
94. Mrs. M. E. J. Gage, Women’s Rights Meeting in a Barn—“John’s Convention.,” reprinted in 1 
HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 19, at 117. 
95. Elizabeth Bowle Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights of Married Women, 1800–1861, at 264– 
71, 274 (Feb. 1960) (Ph.D dissertation, Radcliffe College). 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42. 
97. Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women’s Property Law: Reception of 
Early Married Women’s Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29 J. AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3, 6 (1985). 
98. For example, in 1856, Lucy Stone hailed the impact of women’s rights advocates in the first 
phase of marriage-reform laws: 
Never before has any reformatory movement gained so much in so short a time. . . . 
Now almost every Northern State has more or less modified its laws. . . . 
Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana have also very materially modified their laws. And Wisconsin . . . 
has granted almost all that has been asked except the right of suffrage.  
Lucy Stone, Address to Seventh National Woman’s Rights Convention (Nov. 25–26, 1856), reprinted in 
1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 19, at 632. 
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capacity to bring suit against their husbands.99 Finally, the law reform effort was 
complicated by geographic variance: even before the Civil War, a pattern devel-
oped of much greater hesitancy to abridge husbands’ prerogatives in southern, 
rather than northern, states.100 
Even apart from whether granting the vote to women or ending the vestiges of 
coverture may have seemed more radical and thus less politically feasible in any 
specific context, these structural factors exacerbated the difficulty of changing the 
law of family relations. During any given year, different state legislatures were 
considering bills raising different specific questions. A binding nationwide reso-
lution was achievable only through the Supreme Court, by Congress, or by consti-
tutional amendment. But the governance of marriage and family was a creature 
of state law, the discourse of which would not be constitutionalized until much 
later. 
B. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 
In the wake of the Civil War, Congress transformed the national understanding 
of liberty and equality through adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, but deliberately framed both in ways that rejected considerations 
of women’s legal status.101 In debating the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress 
focused on to whom the vote should be guaranteed and provided its protection 
against denial or abridgement only on account of “race, color or previous condi-
tion of servitude.”102 Exclusion from the democratization of the franchise com-
pelled women’s rights advocates to focus on the vote. They turned to the newly 
adopted Privileges and Immunities Clause and, more generally, the discourse of 
equality. In this era, the master proxy for racial equality—the issue dominating 
national politics—became suffrage, a dynamic which helped move suffrage to 
the top of women’s rights political agenda. 
With Virginia Minor as plaintiff and her husband Francis as lawyer and co- 
strategist, suffrage advocates attempted to secure the right to vote as one of the 
“privileges and immunities” of citizenship and thus protected from infringement 
by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Their 1873 brief to the Supreme 
Court in Minor v. Happersett103 marked a major transition in the framing of wom-
en’s rights. Reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment shifted the priority away 
from the anti-tyranny arguments in the 1848 Declaration, directed at the 
99. Warbasse, supra note 95, at 271, 273; Siegel, supra note 41, at 2138–39. 
100. Warbasse, supra note 95, at 283–84. 
101. Congress rejected an early version of the Thirteenth Amendment which had provided that “no 
person can hold another as a slave,” from concern that it might apply to women as a class. COTT, supra 
note 5, at 80. Women’s rights advocates objected to insertion of the word “male” into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to no avail. EVANS, supra note 24, at 122. One consequence of the end of slavery—ironic 
as a marker of equality—was the extension of the right to marry to formerly enslaved persons. Formerly 
enslaved persons welcomed the removal of this badge of slavery, but marriage law served regulatory as 
well as beneficial ends. KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY 49–50, 
117–43, 163–83 (2015). 
102. See U.S. CONST. art. XV. 
103. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875). 
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restrictions of marriage law, and toward the newly constitutional ground of equal-
ity. Advocates highlighted the absence of voting rights for women by contrast to 
the Fifteenth Amendment. Like all briefs, Minor’s offered the Court a variety of 
rationales, including some that sounded in collective liberty.104 Overall, though, 
it signaled the adoption by women’s rights advocates of more legalistic and tex-
tual arguments.105 
The Supreme Court rejected the Minors’ claims, holding that although women 
were citizens (as were children, for example), the function of Section 1 was only 
to protect the existing privileges and immunities of that status, not to create new 
ones.106 The Court found no indication that the Amendment was intended to over-
turn the virtually universal practice of limiting the franchise to men.107 Thus, the 
states had the authority through their police powers to determine whether women 
were entitled to vote. 
The Minor decision was of a piece with a broad retrenchment after the end of 
Reconstruction. For women, the first sign came in Bradwell v. State, in which the 
Court ruled that Illinois had discretion to deny Myra Bradwell admission to the 
bar.108 The holding was based on the Court’s ruling that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause did not protect one’s choice of profession, but the most fa-
mous passage came in Justice Bradley’s concurrence in which he relied on “a 
constitution of the family” as controlling the domestic sphere to which women 
properly were confined.109 The Court also reneged more broadly on the promise 
of the Reconstruction Amendments, upholding state power to enact Jim Crow 
“separate but equal” laws;110 invalidating the first federal Civil Rights Act as 
improperly extending to nongovernmental actions;111 and stripping the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of meaning or power.112 
The Court’s rulings anticipated the elevation of laissez faire as a dominant 
principle in constitutional adjudication and as a unifying theme of American ju-
risprudence in the post-Reconstruction era. As Frances Olsen pointed out: 
104. The brief asked the Court “to consider what it is to be disenfranchised; not this plaintiff only, 
but an entire class of people . . . . Her disfranchised condition is a badge of servitude.” Plaintiff’s Brief 
and Argument, Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875), reprinted in UP FROM THE 
PEDESTAL, supra note 78, at 241. 
105. The brief included arguments that denial of the vote amounted to a bill of attainder prohibited in 
Article I, Section 9, and sought relief under the Ninth Amendment of rights reserved to the people. Id. at 
236, 241. 
106. Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 171–72. 
107. Id. at 173–74. 
108. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 140, 142 (1873). 
109. Id. at 141. 
110. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). 
111. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883). 
112. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 82–83 (1872). 
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The classic laissez-faire arguments against state regulation of the free market 
find a striking parallel in the arguments against state interference with the pri-
vate family. 
. . . 
Actual inequality and domination in the family . . . are represented as private 
matters that the state did not bring about . . . .113 
The logic of laissez faire depended on and perpetuated the deference paid by 
the legal system to marriage as a quasi-sovereign form of governance, into which 
the official state would not intrude absent drains on the public fisc or visible viola-
tions of moral norms.114 
With regard to family, the private sphere was private in two senses: it was 
immune to public regulation absent extreme circumstances, and it was roughly 
equivalent to private property. “It ‘belonged’ to the husband. And, for a wife, 
being married meant being subject to a husband within his private domain.”115 
As emphasized by the Court in both Bradwell116 and Minor,117 to the extent 
that government ventured into the regulation of the intertwined issues related to 
women’s status and family law, it was to occur by state-level as distinct from fed-
eral action. Like the states’ rights discourse that contributed to the reinstatement 
of white supremacist government through Jim Crow laws, the privileging of 
state-level control of the woman/wife conflation implicitly denied the importance 
of the national and constitutional values through which women claimed full citi-
zenship rights. Instead, the discourse of domesticity merged with that of states’ 
rights to dominate judicial consideration of these issues. Doctrinally and immedi-
ately, the ruling in Minor barred any hope of challenging the laws of coverture 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
C. DOUBLING DOWN ON LIBERAL RIGHTS 
The defeat in Minor ended the suffragists’ attempts to win the vote through ju-
dicial interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments, but they continued to 
deploy the discourse of equality for women. Having established women’s suf-
frage as a national political issue that would not recede from the national stage in 
law or politics, either in Congress or in the Supreme Court, they carried forward 
and prioritized arguments now grounded in the Constitution but presented them 
in the arenas of state-level lawmaking and public opinion. One result was the 
increasing reliance on more individualist liberal rights formulations of their 
claims. 
113. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 1497, 1502, 1506 (1983). 
114. See HARTOG, supra note 35, at 25. 
115. Id. at 108. 
116. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 139. 
117. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 170–72 (1875). 
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The change was evident at a celebration of the nation’s centennial three years 
after Minor, when Susan B. Anthony interrupted the event and read the 
Declaration of Rights of the Women of the United States, which drew on a dis-
course of legal rights grounded in the Constitution.118 
See Declaration of the Rights of Women of the United States - July 4, 1876, IOWA ST. UNIV. 
ARCHIVES OF WOMEN’S POL. COMM., https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/03/21/declaration-of- 
rights-of-the-women-of-the-united-states-july-4-1876/ [https://perma.cc/PJ8G-XUD7] (last visited Apr. 
21, 2020). 
Both the Declaration of 
Sentiments and the 1876 Declaration attacked unfair laws, but whereas the 1848 
Declaration had framed the target as male “establishment of an absolute tyr-
anny,”119 akin to British colonial rule, the 1876 Declaration framed its objections 
as based on specific individual rights.120 It condemned the legal system’s accep-
tance of husbands’ right to control their wives as an unlawful suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus, for example.121 On this point and others, the 1876 
Declaration drew on arguments presented in the Minor case, framed in language 
that aligned with nascent liberal understandings of individual liberty and 
equality. 
IV. THE DUAL CAMPAIGN 
The failure to win inclusion in the Reconstruction Amendments adopted by 
Congress and the defeat in Minor left women’s rights advocates with no choice 
but to redirect their activities back to the states. Women’s rights campaigns 
returned to being highly localized, grassroots, diffused movements that involved 
continuous engagement with state legislatures, petition gathering, and state refer-
enda, with efforts directed to both changing the law of marital relations and 
obtaining the vote.122 But there was one difference compared to the pre-war era: 
the movement’s priorities traded places and suffrage became more the end and 
mobilizing opposition to the power of coverture more the means. 
Nonetheless, when women approached state lawmakers, “they brought marital 
property arguments along with them.”123 The suffrage movement continued after 
the Civil War to be a joint suffrage and marriage-reform movement. Movement 
publications reflected the joint priorities, as did reports from state associations.124 
The self-styled suffrage organizations led the legislative fights on both issues and 
monitored court decisions interpreting the new marriage laws.   
118. 
119. DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS (1848), supra note 19, at 70. 
120. Declaration of the Rights of Women of the United States - July 4, 1876, supra note 118. 
121. See id. 
122. See NANCY WOLOCH, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 332–33 (1984) (“The Minor 
decision made it clear that the ‘new departure’ had no future. . . . Agitation on the state level was by no 
means a total loss, however, since many legislators were willing to vote for a wide array of legal reforms 
affecting women, indeed, for virtually anything except suffrage. . . . [L]egal reform was far easier to 
accept than the highly charged vote.”). 
123. Siegel, supra note 55, at 1168. 
124. Id. at 1168–77. 
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Progress in achieving both goals, however, was slow. The state-by-state pro-
cess, combined with numerous variations in language and scope, made progress 
in enacting married women’s property acts halting and piecemeal.125 Moreover, 
the married women’s property acts were amended multiple times,126 sometimes 
to advance women’s rights, other times to curb them.127 State courts tended to 
interpret the married women’s property acts narrowly.128 Nonetheless, by 1890, 
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia had enacted some version of a 
married women’s property act.129 
Progress on suffrage was also glacial. Between 1870 and 1910, 480 petition 
campaigns to put referendum questions on state ballots resulted in only seventeen 
referenda, only two of which secured votes for women.130 Legislation granting 
the vote was adopted initially for school-board and municipal elections, and then 
within territories and states in the West.131 The first state east of the Mississippi 
River to grant women full suffrage was New York in 1917.132 
Between the end of the Civil War and the adoption of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, the achievement of the greatest political significance was the pro-
cess itself. Debate and contestation over the proper role of women as citizens and 
the proper allocation of rights within marriage drew in many thousands of 
Americans. Based on organizational records, the National Women’s Party en-
rolled approximately two million members in 1917.133 
Id. at 7. In 1920, the U.S. female population was just under fifty-two million. HOBBS & STOOPS, 
supra note 3, at A-13 tab.6 pt.B. The 2017 female population was almost 166 million. Total Population 
in the United States by Gender from 2010 to 2024, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/737923/ 
us-population-by-gender/ [https://perma.cc/Y9XY-WLLT] (last visited Apr. 21, 2020). A rough 
calculation indicates that a comparably sized organization today would have more than six million 
members. 
Both as protest and law 
reform, the campaign for suffrage changed the culture as well as the law of gen-
der, affecting both the rules of governance and the subjective identities of the 
women who participated.134 
It was a deeply compromised movement, however, that produced even the 
most progressive changes. The suffrage campaign grew increasingly conservative 
as many white suffrage advocates argued that white women’s enfranchisement 
125. COTT, supra note 5, at 53–54; Richard Chused periodized the enactment of the married 
women’s property acts in three waves: first, laws that “freed married women’s estates from the debts of 
their husbands,” then the creation of “separate estates for married women,” and finally laws protecting 
the earnings of married women. See Chused, supra note 39, at 1398. 
126. In New York alone, the initial 1848 statute was amended nine times. Siegel, supra note 41, at 
2149. 
127. Id. 
128. See Chused, supra note 39, at 1400. 
129. See DEGLER, supra note 10, at 332–33; WOLOCH, supra note 122, at 333. 
130. See EVANS, supra note 24, at 153. 
131. KRADITOR, supra note 20, at 4–5. 
132. Id. at 6. The Illinois legislature amended its law in 1913 to allow women to vote for presidential 
electors. Id. 
133. 
134. Historian Ellen DuBois argues that: “[i]t was women’s involvement in the suffrage movement, 
far more than . . . enfranchisement . . . that created the basis for new social relations between men and 
women.” See WOLOCH, supra note 122, at 358. 
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would shore up white supremacy135 and outnumber male immigrants who could 
become citizens.136 Racist and nativist arguments by suffragists were not new,137 
but the post-war shift was of a piece with a wider retrenchment in political sup-
port for human rights after Reconstruction. African-American suffragists, to-
gether with white women who rejected racist arguments, battled with other 
whites who seized on what historian Aileen Kraditor called “expedient” tactics 
for attracting more supporters, especially but not only in the South.138 
Another reason for the changing tenor of pro-suffrage arguments was the 
changing composition of the movement. As the years passed after the end of the 
Civil War, fewer of its leaders had personal links to the anti-slavery movement. 
The newer and younger leaders were more likely to be simultaneously involved 
with the temperance campaign.139 Temperance was the other large women-led 
political movement of the time.140 By the end of the nineteenth century, debates 
on suffrage and the social role of women often included arguments of women’s 
moral superiority as a reason for enfranchisement.141 
Moreover, the broader culture was changing in ways that profoundly affected 
women. The growth of cities produced a new class of young women with greater 
personal freedom and access to paid employment.142 For middle-class women, 
the expansion continued of educational and professional opportunities.143 
Although the racial barriers were stark, the same processes occurred on a smaller 
scale for African-American women.144 Divorce, although still rare, increased  
135. See KRADITOR, supra note 20, at 52 (“The suffragists . . . . found that the ‘best’ argument of 
native-born, white, middle-class women was one which would prove their own capacity but not that of 
men or women of the other sections of the population.”); MARILLEY, supra note 28, at 161. 
136. See MARILLEY, supra note 28, at 178–80; WILLIAM L. O’NEILL, EVERYONE WAS BRAVE: A 
HISTORY OF FEMINISM IN AMERICA 71–74 (4th prtg. 1971). 
137. See MARILLEY, supra note 28, at 49. 
138. See KRADITOR, supra note 20, at 52 (“The start of the twentieth century may be taken as the 
turning point in the change from justice to expediency as the chief argument of the suffragists.”); 
MARILLEY, supra note 28, at 161. 
139. KRADITOR, supra note 20, at 56–58. 
140. See EVANS, supra note 24, at 125–30, 148–52; O’NEILL, supra note 136, at 77. 
141. See EVANS, supra note 24, at 154. The 1876 Declaration, for example, asserted morality-based 
claims for the redress of women’s grievances. See, e.g., Declaration of the Rights of Women of the 
United States - July 4, 1876, supra note 118 (“During the temperance crusade, mothers were arrested, 
fined, imprisoned, for even praying and singing in the streets, while men blockade the sidewalks with 
impunity, even on Sunday, with their military parades and political processions. . . .Woman’s degraded, 
helpless position is the weak point in our institutions to-day; a disturbing force everywhere, severing 
family ties, filling our asylums with the deaf, the dumb, the blind; our prisons with criminals, our cities 
with drunkenness and prostitution; our homes with disease and death.”). 
142. See WOLOCH, supra note 122, at 231–34 (noting that in large U.S. cities, immigrant women 
found employment in factories, mills, and domestic settings). 
143. Id. at 276–87. 
144. See generally Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, Clubwomen and Electoral Politics in the 1920’s, 
in ANN D. GORDON ET AL, AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN AND THE VOTE, 1837-1965 (1997) (describing 
increase in the number and influence of middle-class African-American women); Christina Simmons, 
“Modern Marriage” for African Americans, 1920–1940, 30 CANADIAN REV. AM. STUD. 273, 285–87 
(2000). 
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substantially, with wives composing a large majority of plaintiffs.145 
V. WINNING ONE FIGHT, CONTINUING THE OTHER 
In the early years of the twentieth century, the dual suffrage-marriage reform 
campaign continued, intertwined but increasingly distinct. Suffragists prioritized 
a national strategy, developed and centered in Washington, that coordinated state 
campaigns for the vote along with lobbying for Congressional adoption of a suf-
frage amendment. The Nineteenth Amendment constituted both an enormous 
achievement and, by the sense of moving on that the success produced, a loss of a 
clear national focus for women’s rights advocates. Again, seeking reform in mar-
riage and family laws, they returned to the states. 
A. THE TIPPING POINT 
With new national leadership, suffragists developed a broad repertoire of strat-
egies and tactics, from sophisticated interest-group-style lobbying of lawmakers and 
strategizing with the staff of the President, to picketing the White House.146 When 
he was first elected in 1912, President Woodrow Wilson opposed women’s suffrage, 
but his position evolved during his time in office to one of complete support.147 
World War I tipped the political balance in favor of the Nineteenth 
Amendment. In President Wilson’s narrow framing, the primary justification for 
the Nineteenth Amendment was the fairness inherent in payment of a debt. 
Notably, the debt around which he organized this message was itself contingent 
upon women venturing beyond the domestic sphere. Wilson told Congress that: 
We have made partners of the women in this war . . . . This war could not have 
been fought, either by the other nations engaged or by America, if it had not 
been for the services of the women—services rendered in every sphere—not 
merely in the fields of effort in which we have been accustomed to see them 
work, but wherever men have worked and upon the very skirts and edges of 
the battle itself. We shall not only be distrusted but shall deserve to be dis-
trusted if we do not enfranchise them with the fullest possible enfranchise-
ment, as it is now certain that the other great free nations will enfranchise 
them. . . . I propose it as I would propose to admit soldiers to the suffrage, the 
men fighting in the field for our liberties and the liberties of the world, were 
they excluded. The tasks of the women lie at the very heart of the war . . . .148 
Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Senate on the Nineteenth Amendment: (Sept. 30, 1918), AM. 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-senate-the-nineteenth- 
amendment [https://perma.cc/J565-UZUD] (last visited Apr. 22, 2020). 
145. See DEGLER, supra note 10, at 168; PAUL H. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
119–20 (1959). 
146. See COTT, supra note 5, at 53; EVANS, supra note 24, at 166–70; MARILLEY, supra note 28, at 
211–16. 
147. Christine A. Lunardini & Thomas J. Knock, Woodrow Wilson and Woman Suffrage: A New 
Look, 95 POL. SCI. Q. 655, 657 (1980–1981). Historians believe that Wilson was motivated to change his 
views by some mixture of persuasion by suffragists and concern about the election prospects of the 
Democratic Party as more states allowed women to vote. Id. at 670–71. 
148. 
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World War I marked the first significant involvement of women in national 
defense outside of the field of nursing. During the war, eight million women were 
employed in 437 job classifications.149 New women’s divisions in the Army ordi-
nance agency and the Railroad Administration were established.150 For private- 
sector workers, some employers set up the first day nurseries to enable greater 
productivity in key industries.151 
This demand for labor during the war marked a new stage in economic citizen-
ship for women. For the first time, the national government recruited women to 
leave their homes to fill non-domestic, non-gender-typical jobs.152 World War I 
legitimated women’s paid employment as an essential national-defense function 
and a shared civic need, and linked the fate of the nation to the ability of women 
to work outside the home. In the masculinist terms of an argument used by oppo-
nents of suffrage, women gained admittance to a proxy for military service, 
which some argued was historically viewed as a precondition for the right to 
vote.153 
The text of the Nineteenth Amendment addresses only the vote, the direct 
product of the suffrage-focused component of the Women’s Rights Movement. 
But the Amendment’s adoption in 1920 validated both the new political subjec-
tivity of women and the growing acceptance that women had a social and eco-
nomic existence outside the family. For both its supporters and opponents, the 
Amendment “involved breaking with common law traditions that subordinated 
women to men in the family and intervening in domestic matters traditionally 
reserved to state control.”154 Even the most conservative or transactional interpre-
tation of the Nineteenth Amendment implicitly rebutted the discourse of domes-
ticity exemplified in Justice Bradley’s reference to “the constitution of the 
family” in Bradwell.155 
B. EQUALITY AS ONGOING PROCESS 
In the wake of the Nineteenth Amendment, feminists turned to the vestiges of 
coverture that remained, as well as other discriminatory laws. The goal of elimi-
nating class-wide legal discrimination against women156 continued the move-
ment’s strategic focus on the state–family nexus of power, and specifically the 
limitations on both exit from marriage and on entry to the paid workforce. 
Suffragists persisted in their efforts to change state laws.157 The project of 
149. WILLIAM HENRY CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN 49 (1972). 
150. See MAURINE WEINER GREENWALD, WOMEN, WAR, AND WORK: THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR I 
ON WOMEN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 47, 57–60 (1990). 
151. See SONYA MICHEL, CHILDREN’S INTERESTS/MOTHERS’ RIGHTS: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA’S 
CHILD CARE POLICY 88 (1999). 
152. GREENWALD, supra note 150, at 32–35. 
153. KRADITOR, supra note 20, at 28–29. 
154. Siegel, She the People, supra note 2, at 1045. 
155. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141–42 (1872). 
156. NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 75–76 (1987). 
157. SUSAN D. BECKER, THE ORIGINS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: AMERICAN FEMINISM 
BETWEEN THE WARS 18–19, 129 (1981). 
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marriage-law reform remained piecemeal and unwieldly: a decade after suffrage, 
seventeen states continued to treat husbands and wives differently in the sale of 
real estate and, in 1940, almost a quarter of states did not permit wives to 
contract.158 
Reasoning that another new provision in the Constitution could invalidate 
these laws in one preemptive strike, the National Woman’s Party (NWP) voted to 
dedicate itself to securing an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).159 The 
Declaration of Principles adopted at the NWP’s 1922 conference essentially 
updated the 1848 Seneca Falls Declaration with a comprehensive statement of 
post-suffrage demands.160 
See Declaration of Principles of the National Woman’s Party. Adopted at the Conference of 
National and State Officers of the Woman’s party, Washington, D.C., November 11, 1922, LIBRARY OF 
CONG., https://cdn.loc.gov/service/rbc/rbpe/rbpe20/rbpe208/2080340a/2080340a.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M33T-4X2Z].
Although less well-known than the Seneca Falls 
Declaration, the 1922 Declaration of Principles set the modern terms of debate on 
women’s rights until the Second Wave feminists emerged in the 1960s. 
The 1922 Declaration begins and ends with explicit invocations of equality, 
and the concept of women’s equality with men structures each of its twenty-eight 
demands.161 Arguments on freedom from intimate domination remain,162 but the 
goal of liberty from tyranny in the domestic sphere dating from the Declaration 
of Sentiments had fully morphed into one of equality under law. Roughly the first 
half of its enumerated demands cover non-marriage issues such as employment 
and education, but the largest thematic component of the overall content 
addresses legal issues related to marriage. The first draft of the proposed ERA 
continued to address marriage as the legal issue of primary concern by explicitly 
combining equality and marriage: “No political, civil or legal disabilities or 
inequalities on account of sex, or on account of marriage unless applying alike to 
both sexes, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.”163 
Feminists achieved the only major judicial acknowledgment of the Nineteenth 
Amendment as recognition of revolutionary change in women’s legal status in 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.164 The Court’s opinion adopted the position that 
women had the same liberty to contract as men in its striking down of a minimum 
wage law only for women, referring to “the great—not to say revolutionary— 
changes which have taken place . . . in the contractual, political, and civil status 
158. DEGLER, supra note 10, at 333; see also generally Joseph Warren, Husband’s Right to Wife’s 
Services, 38 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1925) (describing a variance in state law as to whether husband could 
relinquish his right to his wife’s services in his business, and uniformity of the absence in state law of 
allowance for relinquishment of his right to wife’s services in the home). 
159. SUSAN D. BECKER, THE ORIGINS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: AMERICAN FEMINISM 
BETWEEN THE WARS 18–21 (1981). 
160. 
 
161. See id. 
162. See id. 
163. Nancy F. Cott, Historical Perspectives: The Equal Rights Amendment Conflict in the 1920s, in 
CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 44, 47 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990). 
164. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
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of women, culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment.”165 Few courts or legisla-
tures followed suit, however, instead reverting to a discourse of domesticity.166 
The campaign was incomplete in a second sense as well: the predominantly 
white ERA advocates paid little attention to the realities of married life for 
African-American women. In a system that was highly racialized even where it 
was not formally segregated, the marriage construct operated differently for 
African-American women than for white women, creating opposite expectations. 
The dynamics of racial capitalism produced a system in which black women of-
ten worked outside their own homes for little money, most frequently in the 
homes of white women, whose quality of life benefitted directly from the domes-
tic incarnation of racial subordination.167 The system also reinforced the higher 
“family wage” earned by white men and enabled the restriction of black men to 
low-wage jobs while still allowing black families to subsist on minimal 
earnings.168 
It is also true that marriage itself had become a more complex reality, although 
the legal rules for allocating power and resolving disputes had changed only par-
tially. Companionate marriage—a union of partners, even if the degree of equal-
ity remained obscure—began to emerge as the new cultural model for American 
couples.169 In many respects, however, the social understanding of companionate 
marriage was of an updated version of separate spheres, with complementary and 
gendered roles for each spouse.170 Progressive Era reformers invoked women’s 
experience and capabilities in managing the domestic sphere as needed to prop-
erly manage similar issues, such as health and charity, in the public sphere.171 
VI. THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
The dual campaign for suffrage and marriage-law reform that produced the 
Nineteenth Amendment created a link between the Constitution and the institu-
tion of marriage that has untapped potential to shape judicial interpretations of 
the regulation of marriage and family law. That this potential remains dormant 
was illustrated by the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, in which the Supreme 
Court ruled that states must permit same-sex couples to marry based on the liberty 
and equality rights of the partners.172 The Court discussed coverture and the inter-
nal dimensions of marriage law only twice, both times superficially. 
165. Id. at 553. 
166. Siegel, She the People, supra note 2, at 1017–19. 
167. JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK AND THE 
FAMILY, FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 135, 139, 142 (2d ed. 2010). 
168. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN’S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS & SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 
9, 122 (1990); see also JONES, supra note 167, at 140. 
169. See EVANS, supra note 24, at 177–78; STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC 
REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 126 (1988). 
170. Siegel, supra note 41, at 2201–10. 
171. KRADITOR, supra note 20, at 68–70. 
172. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015). 
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First, the Court noted that coverture had been “abandoned” with the acceptance 
of “equal dignity” for women.173 Despite a singularly passive construction that 
acknowledged nothing of the history of how or why that change had occurred, the 
context for the comment was a recognition that the structure of marriage had 
evolved greatly over time, producing changed understandings of its social 
meaning. 
The second reference to coverture came in the context of discussing the rele-
vance of the Equal Protection Clause to the case before it. The opinion first 
declared that the equality guarantee provides an enhanced understanding “as to 
the meaning and reach” of the fundamental liberty right to marry.174 The Court 
then turned to its only analysis of the equality rights of partners within marriage. 
The following passage suggests a partial predicate for a constitutional theory of 
marriage: 
Notwithstanding the gradual erosion of the doctrine of coverture . . . invidious 
sex-based classifications in marriage remained common through the mid-20th 
century. . . . These classifications denied the equal dignity of men and women. 
. . . Responding to a new awareness, the Court invoked equal protection princi-
ples to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage. . . . [T]hese 
precedents show the Equal Protection Clause can help to identify and correct 
inequalities in the institution of marriage, vindicating precepts of liberty and 
equality under the Constitution.175 
What the Court could have done at this point in its analysis was draw on the 
understandings of marriage that emerged in the dual campaign for suffrage and 
marriage reform that found constitutional purchase in the Nineteenth 
Amendment. In both its references to coverture in Obergefell, the Court’s omis-
sion of how and why coverture ended is striking. The opinion referred to “unjusti-
fied inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed 
unnoticed and unchallenged.”176 Because the next sentence references the chal-
lenges based on sex discrimination during the 1970s and 1980s,177 one is left 
wondering whether all the Justices are even aware of the Declaration of 
Sentiments and the full scope of the movement that it generated. 
More importantly, both women’s rights advocates and lesbian and gay rights 
advocates noticed and challenged the legal construction of marriage as an institu-
tion in a more thoroughgoing way than the Court suggested. The two movements 
addressed both the internal or endogenous aspects of marriage law, such as cover-
ture, and the external or exogenous aspects of marriage law, including its interre-
lationship with property law. What most powerfully links the two movements is 
that both sought to force the state to regulate marriage as an institution subject to 
173. Id. at 2595. 
174. Id. at 2602–03. 
175. Id. at 2603–04 (citations omitted). 
176. Id. at 2603. 
177. Id. 
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the principles of constitutional governance, including, to use the Court’s phrase, 
“precepts of liberty and equality under the Constitution.”178 
In the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, the endogenous 
aspects of marriage law included the creation of a legal status that produced a 
position of de jure inferiority for all women, married and unmarried. By the time 
of Obergefell, the gender-linked legal statuses of husband and wife had fallen 
away.179 Same-sex couples seeking to marry were challenging their eligibility to 
do so, but not the regulation of interspousal relationships. 
The parallel law of property as an exogenous dimension of marriage law runs 
throughout the history of both movements. In the last century, its importance has 
increased as marriage has become the linchpin of systems of social insurance that 
did not exist at the time of the Nineteenth Amendment. Marriage and marital sta-
tus were fully integrated into the design of the Social Security system and unem-
ployment insurance.180 Social Security and other benefits programs, together with 
tax law, account for the bulk of the more 1,000 instances of the reliance of federal 
law on marital status.181 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT 
1 (2004), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-353R [https://perma.cc/2V6W-GZ23].
Private insurance law, reflected in employee health insur-
ance plans, also routinely uses marital status to define coverage. By the 1980s, 
when LGBT rights groups began to direct attention and advocacy efforts toward 
recognition of same-sex relationships, the denial of eligibility for benefits, espe-
cially health insurance, became a key argument in litigation and lobbying 
efforts.182 
Walter Isaacson, Should Gays Have Marriage Rights?, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at 101–02, http:// 
www.unmarriedamerica.org/Archives/1972-2005-TFC-News-Stories/1989-Time-Gay-Marriage.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6HAE-HF26]; see also, e.g., Nat’l Pride at Work v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 
524 (Mich. 2008) (describing efforts to secure partner benefits through collective bargaining, city 
ordinance, and university policy as well as subsequent litigation regarding the impact of a state 
constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage). 
Whereas marriage, through coverture, had once robbed women of the 
material benefits associated with their property and earnings, by the current cen-
tury marriage had been redeployed as a structural component of public and pri-
vate sources of material support. 
In defense of the Court’s traditionalist, almost folksy language in Obergefell, 
one can point to the discursive strategy used by the same-sex marriage campaign 
to emphasize that its goal was not to change marriage.183 In the later stages of 
both movements, advocates for same-sex marriage and suffrage mixed arguments 
for rights with arguments steeped in respectability and morals. The Obergefell 
opinion embodies precisely that approach, which I would call a rhetoric of 
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CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 98–99, 120–21, 136–41, 292–93 (2001); Alice Kessler-Harris, 
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reassurance. Reassurance may be politically appealing—even necessary—for the 
success of social movements and the popular legitimacy of the Court. But the 
Court also has a responsibility to acknowledge the full force of the social move-
ments upon which it relies for the normative justifications for its decisions. The 
lesson of Obergefell—like the lesson of the Nineteenth Amendment—should not 
be that nothing much has changed. 
Additional questions concerning the regulatory aspects of marriage are likely 
to arise in the future. Some may concern auxiliary issues related to same-sex cou-
ples.184 Or, the centrality of marriage to social insurance may create circumstan-
ces in which access to those forms of property may be in dispute. Whatever the 
context, and the possibilities are extensive, understanding the body of constitu-
tional law applicable to marriage as a legal and social institution and the extent to 
which the Nineteenth Amendment strengthens its regulation in accordance with 
constitutional norms, should be at the heart of the Court’s analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
The path of social movements is not linear, and the history of the campaign 
that led to the Nineteenth Amendment is no exception. It began and remained a 
two-pronged effort for both suffrage and marriage-law reform. Contested under-
standings of marriage as a legal and social institution were central to the public 
meaning of the Nineteenth Amendment. As a result, women’s rights and marriage 
reform have a unique relationship in our constitutional history. 
This Article seeks to return marriage to the center of our understanding of the 
Nineteenth Amendment and to incorporate the history and context of the 
Nineteenth Amendment into our understanding of the legal institution of mar-
riage. Doing so would provide a richer and more persuasive basis for invalidating 
the exclusion of same-sex couples. Today, just as women are no longer defined 
by marriage, marriage is no longer defined by gender. Neither change could have 
occurred without the other.  
184. See, e.g., Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017) (per curiam) (recognizing a right of both 
same-sex spouses to be listed as parents on their child’s birth certificate). 
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